Remuneration In European Commercial Banks by Tóth, József
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                    Vol 12, no 2, 2016 
 84 
Financial Institutions and Services 
 
Remuneration in European Commercial Banks 
 
József Tóth1 
 
Abstract: According to the new rules to be applied in the European Union, data on compensation of 
material risk takers are to be disclosed from year 2014. This paper overviews the different expectations 
regarding remuneration of bank managers highlighting the requirements of European Parliament and 
Council. Furthermore, it analyses data of 18 European banks disclosed based on the new lawful 
requirements. Based on empirical study it proves there is correlation between number of material risk 
takers and value of total assets. However this correlation is not too strong. 
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1. Introduction 
Processes, practices, activities causing global financial crisis started in 2007 are 
various, but there is general agreement in the financial industry, the public sector, 
and academia that incentive structures of the top management of the significant 
financial institutions did not play risk mitigation role. It is underpinned by numerous 
researchers. For example Behr et al. analysed such bonus system concerning 
remuneration of risk takers where the compensation structure rewards loan volume 
and penalizes poor performance. They argue when performance of the portfolio 
managed by them deteriorates, the risk takers approve a higher fraction of loan 
applications. In that case loan officers neglect activities that are not directly rewarded 
under the contract, but are in the interest of the bank. While the reaction given by 
loan officers constitutes a rational response to a time allocation problem, it is not in 
line with the bank interest. The neglected other activities are various: performing 
process built-in control, proper and traceable documentation of the deals, record 
keeping, activities concerning collaterals etc. Though, these activities are not 
honoured by the remuneration system, they are important in the crediting process 
and could cause difficulties in the future.  
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Certain bank leaders motivated by promise of fabulous variable remuneration have 
taken excessive risks that afterwards caused significant loss during the crisis. This 
process was unfavourable for both the shareholders and financial system of 
sovereigns (and finally for the taxpayers). The needs to reform the implemented 
practice was strengthened by the pressure of the public when 9 banks in U.S. paid 
bonuses for year 2008 after receiving bail-out fund or when it was disclosed that the 
French investment bank Natixis, which made significant trading loss in the former 
year and got state support, was going to pay bonuses in amount of EUR 70 million 
to 3,000 employees.  
 
2. Rules Regulating the Remuneration of the Material Risk Takers of 
European Banks 
2.1 Principles of Financial Stability Forum 
In order to promote stability of the international financial system, G7 Ministers and 
Governors endorsed the creation of the Financial Stability Forum (hereinafter FSF) 
in 1999. After a decade, motivated by the above introduced processes, the FSF issued 
its Principles for Sound Compensational Practice. When implementing the 
Principles, banks have to establish effective governance of compensation system that 
continuously monitors and revises the applied compensation structure. The next step 
is alignment of the compensation practice with prudent risk takings. In other words, 
level of remuneration of bank managers should depend on level of risks taken by 
them. According to the Principles of FSF, the implemented remuneration system 
must be monitored by the responsible supervisory organization and the oversight of 
the remuneration system must be rigorous. Furthermore, banks must disclose their 
compensation practice. 
 
2.2 Implementation Standard of Financial Stability Board 
The successor of the Financial Stability Forum, the Financial Stability Board 
(hereinafter FSB) issued the Implementation Standards of the FSF Principles. Based 
on the Standards, banks bearing significant system risk have to establish 
remuneration committees as integral part of the governance system. The 
remuneration committee of a bank should be able to independently evaluate the 
implemented compensation system.  The committee should ensure that the 
remuneration system of the bank is in compliance with the FSF Principles and with 
the related Standard of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereinafter Basel 
Committee). Ayadi and Boujelbene examined the connection between the 
implemented remuneration systems and the insolvency risk of the banks. They 
applied panel data analysis using remuneration data of thirty European banks over 
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the period of 2004-2009 and found negative correlation between the frequency of 
meeting of the remuneration committees and the risk of insolvency of the banks: 
when the frequency of the meetings grew, the risk of insolvency decreased in case 
of banks analysed. The result of this panel data analysis underpins that creation of 
remuneration bodies as integral part of the banking government system has 
significant effect on the banking risks.  
In line with the Principles of FSB, the function of the remuneration committees could 
be fulfilled by other organizational units: the main elements of the remuneration 
system must be defined, monitored and revised by the remuneration committee or its 
equivalent. 
In case of material risk takers (hereinafter MRTs) having significant effect on the 
risk exposure of the bank, the following principles must be fulfilled:  
- Certain part of the remuneration must be variable and must be dependent variable 
of risks taken by the bank. There is no predefined ration; 
- 40-60 percent of the variable compensation is subject to deferral period. The length 
of the period is not determined but cannot be less than 3 years. Nevertheless, the 
study of Leisen shows that such common opinion that deferring the bonus payments 
to the future makes the bank leaders less willing to take risks is false; 
- The deferral part should depend on the level of seniority. The lower level of 
seniority, the lower level of deferred part; 
- More than 50 percent of the variable remuneration must be paid in shares, in share 
equivalent or other non-cash instruments. However, the deferred part of share based 
compensation is not defined; 
- If the financial performance of the bank ruins during the deferral period, the 
unvested part of the remuneration must be retained; 
- If a sovereign must intervene so as to stabilize or bail-out the bank, the supervisory 
authority should have right to restructure the compensation system. Nevertheless, by 
implementing the Directive on Resolution Mechanism such situation may not occur, 
since the standard prohibits the direct intervention of sovereigns; 
- Guaranteed bonus is not acceptable. 
The Implementation Standard requires to disclose the decision making process 
defined in the remuneration policy, the composition of the remuneration committee 
(or equivalent), the main elements of the remuneration system highlighting the 
criteria applied in the performance evaluation, the connection between the 
remuneration and performance, the deferral rules, vesting and malus as well as claw-
back criteria, the applied payment types as well as the aggregated awarded 
compensation. 
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2.3 Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology of Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 
The Compensation Principles and Standards aims to give guideline to supervisors 
when examining banks’ compensation system and supports assessment of the banks’ 
compliance with the abovementioned FSF and FSB Principles and Standards. This 
methodology fosters supervisory approaches in promoting the evolvement of 
prudent compensation practices at banks.  
When the supervisors evaluate the remuneration system of a bank, the following 
aspects must be taken into account:  
1. The control over the design of remuneration system must be actively overseen by 
the top management. The managerial monitoring and review of the compensation 
system is expected so as to ensure the system operates as intended.  Compensation 
outcomes, the related risk evaluations as well as risk outcomes should be regularly 
monitored. Furthermore, the remuneration system should include control 
mechanism; 
2. The remuneration of employees in risk control area should be independent of the 
performance of the professional areas they monitor. This independency must be 
ensured. Moreover, compensation of employees in risk area should be commensurate 
with their key roles; 
3. When determining the remuneration of the employees all types of risk should be 
taken into account. Therefore, both quantitative and qualitative measures should play 
a role in evaluation of supervisors. 4. Also, the result of the bank should be taken 
into account during the calculation of remuneration of banking managers. 
Furthermore, the remuneration of the employees should depend on the risk outcome 
of the bank; 
6. The risks taken must determine the compensation of the employees. In order to 
ensure the fulfilment of this principle, certain part of the remuneration should be 
deferred; 
7. The bank should employ different compensation forms, such as cash, shares and 
shares equivalents.  
8. The Basel Committee expects that supervisory review of the compensation system 
should be rigorous; 
9. Also, information on remuneration system and practice must be disclosed. 
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2.4 Remuneration data of material risk takers to be disclosed based on Pillar 3 
requirement 
The goal of these additional Pillar 3 requirements for remuneration is to support an 
effective market, to make possible for users the assessment of the 
banks’ compensation practices based on information disclosed. Also, the application 
of these requirements contributes to promote the convergence and consistency of 
disclosure on remuneration. Practically, the Basel Committee requires that banks 
bearing significant system risk disclose information on their remuneration design 
and practice in line with FSF Principals and FSB Implementation Standards. Data 
must be related to such employees that have significant effect on risk taking, in other 
word to material risk takers. The rules had to be fulfilled from 2012. The following 
data are to be disclosed: 
- The composition and mandate of the main body responsible for overview the 
remuneration, as well as the external consultants whose advice has been taken into 
account; 
- The scope of the remuneration (e.g. type of material risk takers, regions, business 
lines etc.); 
- Information related to the design and structure of compensation system including 
the main elements and purposes of the remuneration policy; 
- Methods applied by which risks identified in the remuneration system;  
- Information relating to methods by which the bank makes connection between 
level of performance and level of remuneration; 
- Methods by which the bank adjusts remuneration based on longer-term 
performance; 
- Different forms of variable remuneration (e.g. cash based, share based 
remuneration); 
- Number of meetings held by remuneration committee and the compensation 
provided for the committee members; 
- Number of employees who received compensation during the financial year 
(number of material risk takers); 
- Amount of the compensation awarded during the financial year; 
- Data on deferred remuneration. 
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2.5 Recommendations of European Commission 
In 2009, the European Commission issued its own expectations concerning 
principles to be used when implementing the remuneration systems at financial 
institutions. According to the Recommendations: 
- Financial institutions should compile remuneration policies. The policy should be 
in compliance with the strategy, goals and risk management of the institution, that 
is, the compensation system should serve the long term interest of the bank. The 
remuneration policy should be revised annually; 
- Taking the long term interest of the bank into account, the remuneration system 
could not incite to excessive risk taking; 
- The compensation system should make balance between the fixed and variable 
compensation but the variable part should be limited; 
- In order to incite managers for long term sound banking activity, the variable part 
of their compensation should depend on long term performance of the bank. Also, 
the variable part of the compensation should be retained and should be subject to 
deferral pay period; 
- The variable compensation should be paid in shares, options, cash or other financial 
instruments; 
- The institutions are expected to create remuneration committees. As it is defined in 
the FSB’s Principles, the members of remuneration committee should have proper 
profession knowledge and experience; 
- The supervisory board as well as the management board should approve the 
compensation mechanism that determines the remuneration of senior managers. In 
the same time, the remuneration system should define proactive rules so as to avoid 
conflict of interest; 
- The essence of the remuneration system should be disclosed. In the frame of the 
disclosure criteria used in performance assessment, types of remuneration and 
vesting conditions should be specified.  
 
2.6 Capital Requirement Regulation and the related Directive (CRR/CRDIV) 
The European Parliament and Council issued their regulation on prudential 
requirements of banks and directive on access to the activity of credit institutions 
and the prudential supervision of banks. The fulfilment of the expectations of the 
regulation is compulsory for each European bank and the rules defined by the 
directive cannot be significantly modified by the member states. In other approach, 
while the FSF Principles, the FSB Standards, Principles and Standards of Basel 
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Committee as well as Recommendations of European Commission are not generally 
mandatory for each bank, keeping the articles of the new regulation and directive is 
compulsory for the banks funded and operating in territory of the European Union.  
The regulation expects that the following information should be disclosed:  
- Decision making process via which the remuneration of the material risks takers is 
determined; 
- Number of sessions of remuneration committee held in the previous year; 
- Constitution of the remuneration committee and its mandate; 
- Connection between the long term profit of the bank and the long term 
remuneration of the material risk takers; 
- Key points of the elaborated compensation system; 
- Method of performance measurement; 
- Retrospective corrective actions linked to the risks arisen that give opportunity to 
the bank to use malus or claw-back system; 
- Applied rules concerning deferred compensation; 
- Ratio (comparing with the amount of the total remuneration) and amount of the 
paid fixed remuneration in the given financial year; 
- Ratio (comparing with the amount of the total remuneration) and amount of the 
awarded variable remuneration in the given financial year; 
- Criteria of awarding shares, options or other financial instruments; 
- Amount of the total remuneration split into activity segments; 
- Amount of the total remuneration split into cash, shares, share based pay and other 
financial assets; 
- Amount of the total variable remuneration split into shares, shares based pay and 
other financial assets; 
- Amount of the deferred remuneration; 
- Amount of the total remuneration split into management and remaining material 
risk takers; 
- Paid deferred remuneration awarded in the previous years. 
The Directive deals with the remuneration in more detailed form. According to the 
Directive the remuneration could be split into two main parts.  
The first part of the compensation is the fixed based salary. It mirrors the professional 
experience of the employees in question as well as the functions fulfilled by them.  
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The second part of the compensation is based on performance and is variable. 
Generally, the variable part could not be higher than the fixed part. In other words, 
the variable compensation could not be higher than 100 % of the fixed part. However, 
the general meeting of the bank or owners of the bank have right to define higher 
ration. Even if higher ration has been approved, its measure must be lower than 200% 
of the fixed part. However, in Murphy’s opinion, the reaction of the banks will be 
contra-productive. Applying this rule, banks will raise the fixed part of the 
remuneration of material risk takers and their variable remuneration will remain 
relatively on lower lever. Consequently, these measures will reduce the 
competitiveness of the European banks.  
When terminating a contract, the related award should be in line with the related risk 
levels.  
According to the Directive, at least 40% of the variable remuneration is to be paid at 
least in 3-5 years deferred period. Furthermore, the deferred part could be vested if 
the financial situation of the credit institution allows it and if it is reasonable based 
on the performance of the institution, the organizational unit and the employee. 
 
3. Data, methodology 
This section deals with data of actual remuneration of MRTs of top 18 European 
banks1 used in the calculation as well as the applied methodology. During the 
analysis the following was examined: 
1. The ratio of the material risk takers comparing with the total number of 
employees; 
2. The relation between the number of material risk takers and the balance sheet 
total of the selected 18 banks; 
3. The relation between the number of material risk takers and the net income of 
the selected 18 banks; 
4. The average remuneration of the material risk takers; 
5. The ratio of the fixed and variable parts, non-deferred and deferred parts, cash- 
and share-based parts of the variable remuneration. 
                                                     
1 The selected banks were the followings: HSBC Holdings, BNP Paribas, Barclays, Deutsche Bank, 
Crédit Agricole, Royal Bank of Scotland, Société Générale, Santander Group, Groupe BPCE, Lloyds 
Banking Group, ING, UBS, Credit Suisse, Rabobank, BBVA, Standard Chartered, Commerzbank, 
AIB. As it is observable two of the banks above were funded in Switzerland, others must keep the rules 
of CRR/CRDIV. 
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Excluding the Swiss banks, the aggregated balance sheet total of the banks in the 
sample is amounted to 17,694,030 million EUR as of 31/12/2013 which is 44.93% 
of the aggregated balance sheet total of the bank sector in the European Union.  
As for net interest income, the aggregated net interest income of the listed 16 banks 
(excluding two Swiss banks) is 47.57% of the aggregated net interest income of each 
bank in the EU. At the time of compiling the article, data for year 2014 has already 
been disclosed by the selected banks but the aggregated balance sheet data of each 
European bank provided in Statistical Data Warehouse of the European Central Bank 
were not available for year 2014. It is the reason for indicating comparative data of 
year end 2013. However, significant changes in the abovementioned ratios did not 
occur in time period 2011-2013. The ratio of the total assets of the analysed 16 banks 
(excluding two Swiss banks) was 45.15% and 44.83% comparing with the total 
assets of each bank in the European Union in 2012 and 2011. Also, there was not 
significant change in portion of the net interest income of the selected 16 banks 
(48.69% in 2012 and 49.56% in 2011).  
Therefore, it could be stated that the selected banks cover close to half of the whole 
European bank sector. Though, the number of observation used in calculation is low, 
these banks represents close to half of the whole European banking system in terms 
of total assets and net interest income.       
Each analysed bank specified the amount of the total remuneration of the year in 
their annual or Pillar 3 reports but the deferred and non-deferred parts as well as the 
cash based or share based vesting parts were not given by each bank. The lack of 
certain data to be disclosed by the banks made the detailed analysis difficult. If 
certain data of a bank were not available for the analysis this bank was excluded 
from the calculation. 
The following models and calculation was applied in the analysis: 
1. The ratio of the material risk takers comparing with the total number of employees 
Simple average calculation was applied in order to compare the number of material 
risk takers with the number of staff employed by the 18 selected banks.  
2. The relation between the number of material risk takers and the balance sheet 
total of the selected 18 banks 
When the connection between the number of MRTs and the balance sheet total of 
the banks was examined, simple linear regression analysis was used where the 
number of material risk takers was the dependent and the balance sheet total (total 
assets) of the examined banks was the predictor variable. Any of yi can be expressed 
by the following formula:  
  𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖       (1) 
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where  
yi  is the i-th dependent variable (number of risk takers), 
xi  is the i-th predictor variable (total assets), 
β0  is constant (the intercept of the line at y axis), 
β1  is the slope of the line (the coefficient of the predictor variable), 
ei  is the residual value, in other words the difference between the value predicted 
by the model and the actual value at i-th observation. 
Naturally, there are infinite pairs of β0 and β1 but we can find such pair of β0 and β1 
where sum of square of ei-s is the lowest: 
  𝑆𝑆𝐸 = min(∑ 𝑒𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 )        (2) 
where SSE is the lowest sum of squares of ei-s. 
Since ei is sometimes lower and is sometimes higher than the predicted value, their 
effect may reverse. That is the reason for using squares. In case of pairs of β0 and β1 
where the sum of squares is the lowest, the following formula describes the most 
matching line: 
  ?̂?𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖       (3) 
In that case,  
  𝛽1 =
∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)(𝑥𝑖−?̅?)
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)2
𝑛
𝑖=𝑛
         (4) 
and 
𝛽0 = ?̅? − 𝛽1?̅?       (5) 
where  
?̅? is the mean of the predictor values and 
?̅? is the mean of the dependent variables. 
The above described process is the so called ordinary least squares method.  
When determining the most matching line, the tightness of the correlation was also 
examined by calculating the linear correlation coefficient: 
  𝑟 =
∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)(𝑥𝑖−?̅?)
𝑛
𝑖=1
√∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)2∙∑ (𝑦𝑖−?̅?)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
     (6) 
3. The relation between the number of material risk takers and the net income of the 
selected 18 banks 
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The above listed methodology was also applied when examining the relation 
between the number of MRTs and the net income of the banks.  
4. The average remuneration of the material risk takers 
Also, the average remuneration of material risk takers was determined in two kinds 
of approaches. On the one hand banks have to disclose the summarized data of 
remuneration as per salary bands. In the calculation the band average was weighted 
by the number of material risk takers belonging to the respective band. On the other 
hand banks have disclosed the total amount of the remuneration provided to the 
MRTs and these data were used in the simple arithmetical average calculation.  
5. Ratio of the fixed and variable parts, non-deferred and deferred parts, cash- and 
share-based parts of the variable remuneration 
In this case simple percentage calculation was used in the calculation.  
 
4. Results, Discussion 
1. The ratio of the material risk takers comparing with the total number of employees 
The selected 18 banks employed 1,871 thousand employees (full time equivalent) 
out of which there were 15,955 material risk takers at the end of 2014. It means that 
0.85% of the employees were identified as material risk taker. That is, the banks 
identified only the top managers as material risk takers. The requirements in the 
regulations do not exactly determine who has to be classified as material risk takers, 
therefore, banks could tightly interpret this classification.  
2. The relation between the number of material risk takers and the balance sheet 
total of the selected 18 banks 
The number of MRTs might depend on numerous factors: the structure of the 
banking group, the geographical extent, the implemented risk management system, 
the extent of the bank. Analysing how the number of MRTs depends on the balance 
sheet total of the banks, the following chart shows the connection between the extent 
of the banks and the number of material risk takers expressed in full time equivalent 
(FTE) indicator.   
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Chart 1. Connection between total assets and number of MRTs 
Source: IFRS and Pillar 3 reports of the analysed banks, own calculation 
As it is well observable, the numbers of MTRs are around a line (except for two 
extreme cases). This line expresses that in case the balance sheet total (total assets) 
increases by 1 000 million EUR the number of the material risk takers increases by 
0.6 headcount. However, the connection is not too strong (the value of correlation 
coefficient is 0.52). Anyway, it can be concluded that the growth in the total assets 
generates growth in number of material risk takers. Nevertheless, it can be proven 
that there is much stronger correlation between the number of employees and the 
total assets. If it is analysed the correlation coefficient is 0.78. It means that 
increasing in the total assets generates higher ration increasing in the number of 
banking employees than increasing in the ratio of the number of material risk takers. 
This fact also underpins such presumption that probably there are more employees 
in the banks who have dominant effect on risk taking of the banks.   
 
3. The relation between the number of material risk takers and the net income of the 
selected 18 banks 
Since the long term success of the MRTs’ activity might be expressed by the net 
interest income of the bank, we should compare the number of material risk takers 
and the profit originating from net interest income of the banks. In the approach 
above, when the number of MRTs and total asset of the bank were compared, it was 
supposed that the extent of the bank determines the number of risk takers, which is 
natural. However, if we want to compare the numbers of MRTs with the net interest 
income of the banks there is no unambiguous determination. On the one hand the 
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number of risk takers has effect on the interest income. On the other hand the extent 
of the net interest income depends on the measure of the total assets of a bank. 
Therefore, the net interest income may have indirect effect on number of MRTs.  
The following two charts show both cases.  
 
Chart 2 Number of MRTs as dependent variable of the net interest incomes 
Source: IFRS and Pillar 3 reports of the analysed banks, own calculation 
 
 
Chart 3 Net interest incomes as dependent variable of number of MRTs 
Source: IFRS and Pillar 3 reports of the analysed banks, own calculation 
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There is weak correlation between the numbers of material risk takers and net interest 
income of the analysed banks (the correlation coefficient is 0.31). It means that the 
number of material risk takers have no actual effect on the banking result. 
4. The average remuneration of the material risk takers 
As for distribution of the remuneration, significant part (82.13%) of the material risk 
takers has been awarded less than 1 million EUR.   
Further 9.54% of the MRTs has been awarded less than 1.5 million EUR. The 
following chart shows the distribution of the awarded remuneration.  
In case of 4 banks and 1998 material risk takers there is no disclosed information on 
distribution of remuneration. Therefore, the data in the following chart cover 14 
banks and 13957 MRTs. The Chart 4 depicts the summarized number of material 
risk takers as per belonging bands as of 31/12/2014. 
 
Chart 4 Distribution of the remuneration of material risk takers as per remuneration 
bands in the analysed banks 
Source: IFRS and Pillar 3 reports of the analysed banks, own calculation 
If we weight the medium of the bands with the related number of employees, we 
get the average remuneration of the MRTs. The calculation is the following: 
(0 +
999999 − 0
2
) ∙
11463
13957
+ (1000000 +
1499999 − 1000000
2
) ∙
1332
13957
+ ⋯ 
… + (8000000 +
8999999−8000000
2
) ∙
6
13957
= 743085       (7) 
The average remuneration of the MRTs is 743,085 EUR in 2014.  
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Unfortunately, the calculation above is not too accurate in (7) because it used the 
average of the minimum and maximum values of the bands.  
In order to make more precise analysis we could use detailed data on remuneration 
disclosed by the banks. Taking the disclosed detailed remuneration data into account 
the average remuneration of the selected 18 banks and 15955 material risk takers 
was 781,757 EUR in 2014. This average is close to the average determined above in 
case of 14 banks and approximately ten times higher than the average remuneration 
of the banking employees.  
5. Ratio of the fixed and variable parts, non-deferred and deferred parts, cash- and 
share-based parts of the variable remuneration 
The quotient of variable and fixed part can also be determined based on the disclosed 
data. This quotient is 1.12. It means that the variable part of the remuneration is 
higher than the fixed part. As it was mentioned above, the variable component shall 
not exceed 100 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration but member 
states of European Union may allow owners of the banks to approve higher level of 
the ratio between the fixed and variable components of remuneration. Even if it is 
allowed, the overall level of the variable component shall not exceed 200 % of the 
fixed component of the total remuneration. In 6 cases of 18 the variable part of the 
remuneration was higher than the fixed part and in 2 cases this ratio was higher than 
200%. However, these banks do not have to keep the rules of CRR/CRDIV these 
banks were founded in Switzerland.  
As for retained component of the variable remuneration, 14 banks of 18 disclosed 
data on deferred and non-deferred remuneration. In case of these banks, 69.12% of 
the variable remuneration was deferred.  
As for vesting type of variable remuneration, 13 banks provided these types. Based 
on the data disclosed by them, 64.78% of the non-deferred remuneration and 21.41% 
of the deferred remuneration was paid in cash.  
The following chart shows the distribution of remuneration as per components. Data 
include 13 such banks that specified detailed data. 
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Chart 5 Distribution of the different types of the remuneration 
Source: IFRS and Pillar 3 reports of the analysed banks, own calculation 
The largest portion is the fixed remuneration and after that the variable non deferred 
remuneration follows. The deferred parts are distributed close to equal portions.  
 
6. Conclusion  
Crisis started in 2007 attracted attention for banking managerial remuneration. In 
2009, the Financial Stability Forum was the first organization that issued principles 
so as to give guidance to internally regulate the managerial compensation system of 
the banks. After that, numerous expectations, standards, recommendations have been 
given by different international organizations but the capital requirement regulation 
and the related directive of the European Parliament and Council are the most 
important for European banks.  
The article analysed the actual remuneration data of year 2014 disclosed by 18 
European top banks and found correlation between number of material risk takers 
and value of total assets of the banks. However, strong connection between banking 
performance and the level of managerial remuneration was not found. Just a minor 
part of the employees has been identified as material risk taker in the bank which is 
probably not in line with the practice.   
  
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                    Vol 12, no 2, 2016 
 100 
 
References 
Ayadi, N. & Boujelbene, Y. (2012). Compensation of the CEO, Board of Directors and bank risk taking. 
Journal of Advanced Research in Management, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 4-16. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010). Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment 
Methodology. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011). Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for remuneration. 
Behr et al. (2014). Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of 
Effort under an Incomplete Contract. SAFE Working Paper Series, No 62, pp. 27-28. 
European Central Bank: Statistical Data Warehouse. 
European Commission (2009). Commission Recommendation on remuneration policies in the financial 
services sector. 
European Parliament and Council (2013). 575/2013/EU regulation on prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012. 
European Parliament and Council (2013). 2013/36/EU directive on access to the activity of credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. 
European Parliament and Council (2014). Directive on establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and 
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU 
and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council. 
Financial Stability Forum (2009). FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices. 
Financial Stability Board (2009). FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, Implementation 
Standards. 
Leisen, D. (2011). Bonus Deferral Does Not Choke Excessive Risk Taking. Journal of Risk, No 11, pp. 
22. 
Murphy, K.J. (2013). Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study in Unintended 
Consequences, Center in Law. Economics and Organization Research Papers Series, No. C13-8. 
  
